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ENRON, GLOBAL CROSSING, AND
BEYOND: IMPLICATIONS FOR WORKERS
SUSAN J. STABILE t
INTRODUCTION
Within the last nine months, we have been bombarded with
news of financial scandals involving large publicly held U.S.
corporations. The collapses of companies such as Enron and
Global Crossing are not aberrations. Instead, they are the direct
result of managerial behavior aimed at short-term profit
maximization. That behavior, in turn, is a predictable
consequence of executive pay structures that measure and
reward performance based on short-term financial results.
Managers are under pressure to produce the financial results
that Wall Street expects to see in order to continue to be
generously rewarded.
Whatever other consequences flow from such behavior,
workers suffer tremendously. Workers are sold on the benefits of
investing in company stock, an investment that in reality is
largely intended to benefit management. Although workers
benefit when the value of a company's stock rises, they suffer
disproportionately compared to executives in the case of stock
failure. Not only are executives in a far better position to know
when to sell company stock than are workers, but workers are
sometimes prevented from selling their largest stakes in
employer securities through lockdowns of their 401(k) plans,
such as in the Enron context. Further, corporate employers
often encourage workers to invest and stay with their
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University School of Law Center for Labor and Employment Law. An earlier version
of this Article was presented at the Cornell Law School Feminist and Legal Theory
Workshop held in Toronto on September 13-14, 2002, and I am grateful to the
workshop participants for their helpful comments. I am also grateful for the
research assistance of Nichol Hart.
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
investment in company stock, even as managers sell off their
own equity holdings.
This Article discusses the link between the pay structure of
executives and the type 'of behavior that led to the collapses of
companies like Enron and explores the reasons why workers,
those least able to protect themselves, are disproportionately
harmed when such collapses occur. It then considers various
means to better protect workers.
I. EXECUTIVE PAY AND EXECUTIVE MISBEHAVIOR
Over the last twenty years, in response to shareholders'
complaints that executives were being paid like bureaucrats and
lacked sufficient incentives to act in the best interests of
shareholders, an increasing piece of executives' compensation
has taken the form of contingent compensation rather than base
pay.' Specifically, stock options have grown to represent the
major component of executive pay.2 The median value of stock
options granted to CEOs in 1999 ranged from a low of 89% of the
CEO's salary to a high of 245% of the CEO's salary. 3
Theoretically, contingent compensation should align the
interests of executives with those of shareholders. The thought
behind compensating with stock options is that if the
shareholders do well, executives gain and if the shareholders do
I See Susan J. Stabile, One for A, Two for B and Four Hundred for C: The
Widening Gap in Pay Between Executive and Rank and File Employees, 35 U. MICH.
J.L REFORM (forthcoming 2002) (manuscript at 22-23, on file with author)
(discussing the role of shareholder activism and shareholder primacy norm in
explosion of use of incentive pay for executives).
2 See Hamid Mehran & Joseph Tracy, The Effect of Employee Stock Options on
the Evolution of Compensation in the 1990s, 7 FED. RES. BANK N.Y. ECON. POLY
REV. 17, 20 (2001) (noting that new grants of stock options average about 250% of
an executive's base salary and bonus); Tod Perry & Marc Zenner, CEO
Compensation in the 1990s: Shareholder Alignment or Shareholder Expropriation,
35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 123, 131 (2000) (observing that from 1992-1998, the
salary component of CEO pay decreased from 45% to 28% of total executive
compensation and the option component increased from 16% to 35%); AFLCIO
Executive Pay Watch, Runaway CEO Pay: What's Happening and What You Can Do
About It, available at www.aflcio.org/paywatch/ceopay.htm (noting that almost two-
thirds of CEO pay takes the form of stock options).
3 See Michael E. Mooney, Mitigating the Pain of Equity Compensation in a
Down Market, TAX NOTES, Nov. 19, 2001, at 1099. The average stock option award
to CEOs in that year-measured by stock price times number of shares-was ten
million dollars, more than twice the value of awards made only three years earlier.
See id.
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not do well, executives do not gain.4 Other types of contingent
bonus arrangements achieve the same result by conditioning
bonus payments on achievement of certain performance targets.5
Unfortunately, neither side of that equation works perfectly.
First, as I have explored in more depth elsewhere, 6
manipulation of contingent compensation arrangements means
that executives do not necessarily suffer financially when the
stock price of a company falls. For example, practices like
repricing options have the effect of eliminating any risk that
option compensation puts on executives.7
Second, and more importantly for purposes of this
discussion, excessive reliance on incentive compensation creates
the wrong incentives for executives. Even at the most benign
level, placing significant portions of an executive's pay at risk
encourages risk taking and an emphasis on short-term stock
rises that gives insufficient attention to the company's long-term
best interests.8 Executives who receive the bulk of their pay in
the form of stock options have "enormous incentive to get the
stock price up in time to cash in their options."9
4 See 2 MICHAEL J. CANAN, QUALIFIED RETIREMENT AND OTHER EMPLOYEE
BENEFIT PLANS app. A § 2.6 (1997) (describing the general operation of stock option
plans).
5 See MICHAEL J. CANAN & WILLIAM D. MITCHELL, EMPLOYEE FRINGE AND
OTHER WELFARE BENEFIT PLANS § 7.3 (2002) (describing the general operation of
short-term incentive plans).
6 See Susan J. Stabile, Motivating Executives: Does Performance-Based
Compensation Positively Affect Managerial Performance, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L.
265-70 (1999).
7 See, e.g., Lucian Ayre Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction
in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 765 (2002) (citing
options repricing and granting of reload options as illustrative of power CEOs
exercise over the design of executive compensation packages). Indeed, many take it
as a given that adjustments must be made to mitigate the pain to executives caused
by a decline in stock value. See Mooney, supra note 3, at 1099 (discussing ways to
mitigate the adverse impact of falling stock prices on executives).
8 See A.B.A. TASK FORCE ON CORP. RESP., PRELIMINARY REPORT 8 (July 16,
2002) (stating that an unanticipated consequence of the growth of equity-based
compensation is a powerful incentive for executive officers to meet Wall Street
earnings expectations and avoid negative impact on current stock prices); DEREK
BOK, THE COST OF TALENT 245 (1993) (finding that overly large rewards may tempt
people to engage in strategies that are not necessarily in the company's best
interest); Adam Bryant, Feeding the New Work Ethic, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1998, at
1 (noting that options provide incentives for CEOs to take steps to boost stock price,
such as engaging in acquisitions and divestitures).
9 Paul Krugman, The Outrage Constraint, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2002, at A17.
Krugman's article also discusses corporate programs of acquisition and expansion
20021
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It is, of course, difficult to prove that executive pay plans
caused certain corporate action. It is not difficult, however, to
find examples that suggest exactly that. For example, is it
coincidence that, following Bristol-Myers' adoption of a new long-
term incentive plan that based awards on sales growth, the
company began to use incentives to induce its wholesale
customers to buy more products than they needed? 10  The
practice tremendously boosted sales for the year, which resulted
in large executive bonus payments." It also, however, resulted
in the company's wholesalers holding hundreds of millions of
dollars of excessive inventory, the effect of which will be reduced
revenue in this year. 12
Less benignly the use of options as "a system that lavishly
rewards executives for success tempts those executives, who
control much of the information available to outsiders, to
fabricate the appearance of success. Aggressive accounting,
fictitious transactions that inflate sales, whatever it takes."13
The shift from the heavy use of fixed compensation to increasing
reliance on incentive pay has been accompanied by increasing
incidents of misrepresentative accounting and other
improprieties on the part of corporate executives.' 4 Even in the
absence of actual fraud, executives are tempted to take-and do
"that ended in grief-but only after top executives had profited immensely." Id.
10 See Gretchen Morgenson, An Idea Gone Haywire: Linking Executive Pay to
Sales, N.Y. TIMES, July. 14, 2002, § 3 at 1.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Paul Krugman, Greed Is Bad, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2002, at A19; see also
BOK, supra note 8, at 245 (pointing out that it is difficult to set rewards "large
enough to motivate effectively but not so large as to tempt people to resort to
improper or even illegal behavior to qualify"); Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Means
for the Management and Control of the Modern Business Corporation: Some Initial
Reflections, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1233, 1247 (2002) (discussing the fact that executives
with high amount of option compensation have an incentive to use any means they
can to increase stock price, including fraud and excessive risk-taking); Detlev Vagts,
Challenges to Executive Compensation: For the Market or the Courts, 8 J. CORP. L.
231, 242-43 (1983) (noting that earnings-based compensation plans may drive
executives towards illegal actions because compensation plans are calculated on
increasing profits and annualized earnings figures that are manipulable).
14 See Krugman, supra note 13, at A19 (noting that "statistics for last five years
show dramatic divergence between the profits companies report to investors and
other measure of profit growth"); Krugman, supra note 9, at A17 (observing that
despite the fact that national statistics show that corporate profits grew very little
over the last few years, most large public companies reported double-digit profit
growth in each of the last few years).
[Vol.76:815
IMPLICATIONS FOR WORKERS
take-what, at best, can be described as aggressive positions.
Thus, for example, Merck & Company, which utilized an
executive bonus plan based on comparing the company's growth
in its revenue and earnings to that of its health care peers, last
year included fourteen billion dollars in revenue in prescription
co-payments that the company never received and that are not
reflected in the company's net income. 15 Similarly, in 1998
Green Tree Financial Corporation was forced to restate its 1996
profits resulting in its CEO having to pay back a significant
portion of his 1996 bonus payment. This occurred after
shareholders accused the company of using overly aggressive
accounting methods to boost profits-and therefore the CEO's
bonus.16
II. DISPROPORTIONATE IMPACT OF EXECUTIVE MISBEHAVIOR ON
WORKERS
A. Overselling Employees on the Value of Investing in Company
Stock
There may be legitimate reasons not to give employees a
financial stake in the fortunes of the employer. Doing so allows
employees to share in corporate prosperity. It also induces
employees to perform by allowing them to benefit from corporate
gains. Certainly employers believe that providing employees
with stock will promote loyalty and productivity. 17 Moreover,
there is some evidence that supports this belief. For example,
one study evaluating the effect of broad-based employee stock
15 See Morgenson, supra note 10, § 1 (also citing belief of Merck's general
counsel that the accounting accurately reflected the company's results).
16 See Martha M. Hamilton, Bonus King to Pay Back Chunk of $102 Million
Take, WASH. POST, Jan. 29, 1998, at El (suggesting that the company's
compensation arrangements gave CEO Coss the incentive to back such optimistic
accounting arrangements); Adam Zagorin, Too Good to be True: Larry Coss, the
Prince of Pay, Must Give Back a Chunk of His Bonus, TIME, Feb. 23, 1998, at 47
(noting that the company denied that its accounting methods were designed to
increase profit and the CEO's pay).
17 See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, EMPLOYER STOCK IN 401(K) PLANS 3 (Feb.
28, 2002) (discussing employer beliefs regarding value of employee holdings of
company stock); Robert Luke, Workers Still Want Company Stock Despite Enron
Fall, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Feb. 1, 2002, at 1C (citing the president of 401(k)
Association regarding employer expectation that " 'employees with an ownership
stake are more loyal and productive.... and that senior management ... likes stock
to be in friendly hands' ").
20021
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option plans on corporate performance found that companies
with such plans have significantly higher productivity as
compared to public companies as a whole and peer companies as
a group.18
Giving employees a meaningful stake in their employer is
one thing; giving them a disproportionate stake, however, is
another. A broader range of employees is beginning to receive
increasing numbers of stock options and bonus stock as a
component of their compensation. 19  In addition, we have
reached a point where the 401(k) plan accounts of a significant
number of employees are bloated with company stock.20 Workers
whose companies offer an employer stock fund, which includes
401(k) plans of most large public enterprises, direct an average
of about thirty to forty percent of their contributions to their
employer's stock.21 These high concentrations still exist despite
18 See Joseph Blasi et al., Broad-Based Stock Options and Company
Performance: What the Research Tells Us, in JOSEPH BLASI ET AL., STOCK OPTIONS,
CORPORATE PERFORMANCE, AND ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE 14 (2000) (finding 38%
higher productivity than all public companies and 37% higher than peer group); see
also John Core & Wayne Guay, Stock Option Plans for Non-Executive Employees, 4
(2000) (working paper, on file with author) (noting that although lower-level
employees may not influence stock price through individual action, granting of stock
options "potentially induces mutual monitoring and thereby improves group
incentives"). The evidence on this part is far from uniform, with others finding less
evidence of positive gains flowing from broad-based employee stock ownership. See
Joseph Blasi et al., Employee Stock Ownership and Corporate Performance Among
Public Companies, 50 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 60, 63-64 (1996) (discussing prior
studies of broad based employee stock ownership and finding that "the very
dispersed results reported by prior studies leads to no overall conclusion that
employee ownership is associated with better or worse performance"); Charles D.
Ittner et al., The Structure and Performance Consequences of Equity Grants to
Employees of New Economy Firms 33 (Jan. 2000) (working paper, on file with
author) (reporting study findings that grants to lower level employees are not
positively associated with increases in shareholder value).
19 See Geeta Sundaramoorthy, Executive Pay Rides High on Options, BUS.
NEWS, June 27, 2000, at 6 (reporting findings of the National Center for Employee
Ownership that the number of employees who have been granted stock options by
their employers has grown from about one million in 1992 to about ten million
today).
20 Some would argue that no 401(k) plan assets should be invested in company
stock. As Professor Shlomo Benartzi explains, " 'Since you already have all your
human capital invested in the company, my rule of thumb is, don't invest any of
your plan assets in the company.'" Enron Debacle Will Force Clean Up of Company
Stock Use in DC Plans, INST. OF MGMT. AND ADMIN (IOMA), DC PLAN INVESTING,
Dec. 11, 2001, at 1,7 [hereinafter Enron Debacle].
21 See id. at 3 (noting that in plans with 5000 or more participants, company
stock accounts for 43% of total plan assets); Company Stock Investment Remains
Too High In Over Half of Plans Tracked, IOMA DC PLAN INVESTING, Aug. 13, 2002,
[Vol.76:815
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the bad publicity that surrounded the losses to plan participants
caused by the fall of companies like Enron. 22 In addition to
employees' own contributions, many companies require that
employer matching contributions be invested in employer
securities, resulting in even higher accumulations. 23 This puts a
significant portion of a participant's retirement assets at risk
when a company suffers a financial downturn.24
It should come as no surprise that employees voluntarily put
so much of their future financial security at the hands of the
future performance of their employer. Adding to employees'
feelings of loyalty to the employer, 25 employers continually tout
at 1-2 (stating that as of August, average investment of all participants in plans
with an employer stock fund was 28%). Many participants have account balances
that far exceed the average. See id. (highlighting that participants employed by a
dozen of 318 surveyed sponsors have more than 75% of their 401(k) account balance
in company stock).
22 See Workers Need to Invest Wisely, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Aug 30, 2002, at
21A (reporting IOMA and Hewitt survey results that workers continue to overinvest
in employer securities); see also Christine Dugas, Company Stock Still Fills Many
401(k) Plans, USA TODAY, Aug. 26, 2002, at 1B; John Wasik, Weaning Employees off
Their Employer, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2002, at 22 (reporting results of Hewitt study
showing that majority of surveyed employees still believe company stock is as safe
an investment as a money-market mutual fund and that one-fifth of employees 60
and older had all their 401(k) assets in company stock).
23 This results both from the effect of the match itself and because participants
in plans that require a match in employer securities tend to invest a higher
percentage of their self-directed funds into company stock than participants in plans
that do not have the required match feature. See The Role of Company Stock in
401(k) Plans, Retirement Security: Picking up the Enron Pieces: Hearing Before the
Senate Comm. on Fin., 107th Cong. 5 (2002) (statement of Jack L. VanDerhei)
(finding that company stock represents 33% of a participant's account balance in
plans where company match must be invested in company stock versus 22% in
plans lacking that requirement); Sarah Holden & Jack VenDerhei, 401(k) Plan
Asset Allocation, Account Balances, and Loan Activity in 1999, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT
RES. INST. (EBRI), Feb. 2001, at 13 (finding that where plans require that company
matches be invested in company stock, participants tend to direct a higher
percentage of their self-directed funds into that option as well).
24 To give some examples from a recent Institute of Management and
Administration study: Coca-Cola Co.'s 401(k) plan is 81% invested in company stock
and the stock declined 22% in 2001; Texas Instruments, 75% invested in company
stock, stock down 32%; Williams Cos., Inc. 75% invested in company stock, stock
down 33%; McDonald's Corp., 74% invested in company stock, stock down 21%. See
Enron Debacle, supra note 20, at 2.
It is also worth noting that the incentive justification for employee stock
ownership operates less strongly with respect to stock held through 401(k) plans
than direct holdings of stock or stock options. See Gordon, supra note 13, at 1248-
49.
25 Many employees invest heavily in employer stock out of a sense of loyalty to
their employers. See Lewis Braham, Institutional Asset Management: The Growing
2002]
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the value of holding company stock, as evidenced by the
numerous press reports of statements made by Enron executives
to rank and file employees during 2001.26 Even worse, many
believe that companies do more than "objectively" tout the value
of company stock. During a press conference held in March of
this year, Senator Ted Kennedy expressed his belief that "the
main reason why Enron workers lost more than a billion dollars
is that they were pressured by Enron executives to put all their
401(k) money in company stock."27 Allegations of such employer
pressure as well as of misrepresentations designed to induce
employees to remain invested in company stock have been
advanced not only in lawsuits commenced against Enron,28 but
also in a number of lawsuits that have been filed against other
employers by participants who have suffered heavy plan losses
as a result of downturns in the employer's stock.29 Certainly,
Number of Options in Qualified Plans Is a Boon for Planners in the Short Run But
Could Spell Trouble in the Long, FIN. PLAN., July 1, 1997, available at 1997 WL
10306217, at *7 (explaining that despite lack of diversification, employees over-
invest in employer securities because "often even the most sophisticated employees
remain doggedly loyal to their mother company"); Adam Bryant, Betting the Farm
on Company Stock, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1995, § 3, at 1 (stating that for many
employees, the issue is emotional; employees invest heavily in employer securities
even though they say they would never advise a relative to be so heavily invested in
a single stock). As one employee explained, "I was loyal to the company. The CEO
said the company stock would turn around. I'm sorry to say I believed him." Keith
Herbert, WorldCom Victim Shares NCC Stage with Democratic Candidate,
MORNING CALL, Aug. 28, 2002, at B6. Other employees feel that they "owe
something to the company" and therefore should invest in company stock. Susan
Strother Clarke, Area Workers' 401(k)s Bet on Employer Stock, ORLANDO SENTINEL,
Mar. 3, 2002, at Al (quoting Professor Patricia Dilley).
26 See Am. Compl. % 240-73, Tittle v. Enron, No. 01-CV-3913 (S.D. Tex. Filed
Nov. 28, 2001) [hereinafter Amended Complaint].
27 Press Conference, Sen. Ted Kennedy (D-MA), Sen. Jeff Bingaman (D-NM),
Sen. Jon Corzine (D-NJ), and Sen. Barbara Boxer (D-CA), Federal News Service
(Mar. 6, 2002).
28 Amended Complaint $% 240-73.
29 For example, a lawsuit filed against Lucent Technologies alleges such
manipulation. See Reinhart & Smith v. Lucent Tech., Inc., No. 01-CV-3491 (D.N.J.
2001). The complaint alleges that Lucent induced plan participants to invest in, or
continue to invest in, Lucent stock despite the fact that the company knew of
serious business problems that would adversely affect the value of the stock. A
similar such action was brought against Ikon Office Solutions, and a class certified
in 2000. See In re Ikon Office Solutions, Inc., 191 F.R.D. 457, 459-60 (E.D. Pa.
2000). The Ikon litigation was recently settled, with the company agreeing to make
certain changes to its 401(k) plan, including allowing participants with at least two
years of service to invest company matching contributions in funds other than
employer securities. See Ikon Office Solutions, Ikon Settles ERISA Litigation (May
14, 2002), available at http://www.ikon.com/reading/press-releases/releases/
[Vol.76:815
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practices like requiring matching contributions to be invested in
company stock and offering company stock at a discount to
employees 30 suggest employer attempts to influence employees to
invest in such stock.31
It is not difficult to understand why executives might be
motivated to exert such pressure. Stock in the hands of
employees is stock in friendly hands.32 Employers believe that
employees will be more concerned with current job security than
with the future value of their retirement benefit and thus will
make voting and tender decisions that favor the interests of
current management. 33 There is good basis for that belief.
Employees often have strong feelings of identification with their
employer and "derive psychological or emotional benefit from
making decisions they perceive to be in the best interests of
current management."34 At a minimum, employee shareholders
are less likely to be vocal antagonists to management positions.
According to survey results of the Employee Benefit Research
Institute, sixty-five percent of surveyed plan participants
indicated that they would not vote in favor of an acquisition of
their employer by a hostile acquirer even if doing so would result
051402b.asp. Most recently, lawsuits were filed by 401(k) plan participants against
both Tyco International (US) Inc. and Halliburton, in each case alleging
misrepresentations by the company regarding its financial affairs. See, e.g., Pitman
v. Halliburton Co., Inc., No. 02-CV-1514, (N.D. Texas filed July 17, 2002); Johnson
v. Tyco Intl, Ltd, No. 02-80636, (S.D. Fla. filed July 2002).
30 See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Employees, Pensions and the New Economic Order, 97
COLUM. L. REV. 1519, 1555-56 (1997) (suggesting that one of the reasons so much
401(k) money is invested in employer securities is that employers often offer stock to
employees at a discount).
31 See Pension Institute, Olivia S. Mitchell & Stephen P. Utkus, Company Stock
and Retirement Plan Diversification, Apr. 2002, at 31, 34, available at
http://prc.wharton.upenn.edu/prc/PRC/WP/WP2002-4.pdf (noting that employees
may be "encouraged through management promotion of the stock, and possibly
organizational pressure to buy and own shares in the company"). Employers
certainly have an incentive to pressure employees. As one commentator observed,
"If you take a company that has 30,000 or 40,000 employees, and all of those people
are buying the stock, that supports the price and makes the company look better. A
lot of CEOs get paid on the basis of the stock price, so there's an incentive to do
that." Ed Taylor, Pension Groups Worry About Congressional Interference after
Enron, EAST VALLEY TRIBUNE BUsINESS NEWS, Mar. 4, 2002 (quoting James Dew,
director, Financial Planning Association), available at www.lexis.com.
32 See Susan J. Stabile, Pension Plan Investments in Employer Securities: More
Is Not Always Better, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 61, 90 (1998) (discussing entrenchment
impact of plan investments in employer securities).
33 See id.
34 Id. at 103.
2002]
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in a fifty percent return on their investment, and fifty-six
percent said they would not do so even for a one hundred percent
return on their investment.35
B. Employees Lack Executives'Ability to Protect Themselves
To be sure, executives have significantly greater holdings of
company stock than do rank and file employees. 36 A precipitous
decline in the value of the company's stock, however, poses far
greater risk for rank and file employees than for executives.
First, whereas the largest executive holdings are in the form
of stock options, the largest accumulations for rank and file
employees are in company stock held in a 401(k) plan account.37
When the company's stock price falls, the executive has simply
lost the potential gain from stock options. Even that is not
guaranteed, given the frequent practice of repricing options. 38
For employees who hold actual stock in their 401(k) plan,
however, there is a real loss. For example, Enron's 401(k) plan
lost approximately $1.3 billion in value between January 2001,
when the stock traded at eighty dollars per share, and December
2, 2001, when it traded at less than one dollar per share. As a
result, many participants lost between seventy and ninety
percent of their retirement funds.39
Second, executives have greater access to information that
gives them earlier warning that selling company shares may be
desirable.40 At best, executives fail to share this information; at
worst, they deliberately hide it. Lawsuits filed against Enron,
Global Crossing, and other companies charge that
35 Public Attitudes on Employee Ownership and Benefit Promises, EBRI, 1994,
at 22.
36 See David Leonhardt, Stock Options Said Not to Be As Widespread As
Backers Say, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2002, at C1.
37 See Susan J. Stabile, Another Look at 401(k) Plan Investments in Employer
Securities, 35 JOHN MARSHALL L. REV. 539, 542 (2002) (noting that many 401(k)
plans are heavily invested in employer securities).
38 See Pallavi Gogoi, When Good Options Go Bad, Bus. WK., Dec. 11, 2000, at
96 (giving examples of companies that have repriced existing options or granted new
options because of stock price decline).
39 See Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Employees' Retirement Plan Is a Victim As Enron
Tumbles, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2001, at Al (discussing losses suffered by Enron
employees who invested their savings in Enron's 401(k) retirement plan).
40 See Myths and Realities of Executive Pay: Hearing Before the Senate Comm.
on Fin., 107th Cong. 5 (2002) (statement of Ira T. Kay, Practice Director,
Compensation Consulting, Watson Wyatt Worldwide).
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misrepresentations encouraged participants to invest in
company stock and to continue investing even when their
company faced financial trouble. 41 They also claim that the
companies withheld information about the companies' worsening
financial situation.42
Again, the example of Enron is illustrative. Via an internal
company newsletter, Enron 401(k) plan participants received the
same inflated earnings statements for the years 1997 through
2000 that were disclosed to the company's other shareholders. 43
In addition, they also received numerous communications
through e-mails, company newsletters, and employee meetings
touting the future prospects of the company's stock.44 CEO Ken
Lay reportedly sent employees a letter on August 14, 2001
acknowledging that stock prices had suffered over the last few
months, but noting that the company's performance had never
been stronger and its growth never more certain. 45 It appears
that Lay continued to make such statements even after receiving
a memorandum in August from Sherron Watkins, Enron's Vice-
President of Corporate Development, which raised the fact that
several senior company officials had questioned the company's
accounting methods, including the fact that the partnership
accounting arrangements had inflated the value of Enron
stock.46 There seems to be little question that employees were
not privy to the same information about the company's true
financial state that was available to senior executives, many of
whom were selling a significant amount of their own shares even
as they were continuing to tell employees what a good
investment the company's stock represented.47
Third, employees may not be free to sell company shares
held in their 401(k) plan account. Many 401(k) plans require
that any matching contributions be made in company stock.48
41 Enron, Northern Trust Target of Class Action by Enron Employee Stock
Ownership Plan Participants, Company News, Bus. WK., Dec. 8, 2001, available at
http://research.businessweek.com.
42 Id.
43 See Amended Complaint I 204-39.
44 Id. 240-73.
45 Id. T 267.
46 Id. 1%268-69.
47 Id. T 269.
48 See Theo Francis, Company Stock Fills Many Retirement Plans Despite the
Potential Risks to Employees, WALL ST. J., Sept. 11, 2001 (noting that many
employers match employee 401(k) contributions with company stock, giving Gillette,
2002]
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Typically, such plans also contain a requirement that such
shares cannot be diversified until the participants reach a
certain age.49 Enron's 401(k) plan, for example, prevented
participants from disposing of Enron shares acquired from
matching contributions until age fifty.50 Thus, even if Enron
employees had been aware of the magnitude of the company's
financial difficulties, they would have been unable to sell those
shares.
Moreover, as was also the case with Enron, even though
participants are generally free to sell shares attributable to their
own plan contributions, they are sometimes prevented from
doing so. Allegations against Enron include claims based on a
lockdown, or a suspension of plan trading that prevented
participants from transferring funds out of company stock while
stock value declined sharply.51
It is true that executives holding matching shares in their
401(k) plan are subject to the same limitation on trading
employer securities acquired by virtue of a company matching
contributions and to the same prohibition on trading during a
lockdown as are rank and file employees. Executives, however,
tend to have a very small portion of their total retirement assets
Abbott Labs, and Coca-Cola as examples of such companies); Patrick J. Purcell, The
Enron Bankruptcy and Employer Stock in Retirement Plans, CRS REPORT FOR
CONG., March 11, 2002, at 3-4 (noting that 45% of plans with an employer stock
option require that all matching contributions be invested in company stock).
49 See Purcell, supra note 48, at 6 (noting that 34% of companies that match in
company stock require participants to reach a certain age-typically 50 or 55-
before they can sell the stock).
50 Press Release, Enron Corp., Enron Explains Basic Facts About Its 401(k)
Savings Plan (Dec. 14, 2001), available at http://www.enron.com/corp/pressroom/
releases/2001/ene/100-l2l4OlReleaseLtr.html.
51 On October 17, 2001, the account balances of Enron's 401(k) plan
participants were frozen, preventing them from moving their plan assets between
plan funds. On that day, Enron's stock was trading at $32.30/share. During the
period participants were prevented from moving assets out of the company stock
fund, the value of the stock dropped precipitously. See Enron Debacle, supra note
20, at 1, 3; SUSAN J. STABILE, LESSONS FROM ENRON: SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT TO
401(K) PLAN ANSWER BOOK E-1 (2002) (discussing dispute between company and
employees regarding actual dates of lockdown).
Lockdowns themselves are not problematic and are, indeed a routine occurrence
in 401(k) plans. According to one survey, 74% of responding plans had undergone at
least one lockdown, and on any given business day, almost 100 plans are in a
lockdown situation. The problem arises if the company's stock fluctuates
dramatically during the period in which participants are prohibited from trading
shares. Id.
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in their employer's qualified plan and thus are much less
affected by the operation of such a restriction.5 2
C. Female Employees May Be the Most Vulnerable
Sufficient 401(k) plan accumulations are particularly
important for female employees. Not only do women have longer
life expectancies than men,53 but their shorter tenure in the
workforce and lower wages generally result in lower Social
Security entitlements. 54  Women also generally have less
personal savings.55 Thus, women both need more money to
support themselves during their retirement and have less
sources of retirement income than men.
It does not appear from the statistical evidence available
that women are any more likely to initially invest in employer
securities than are men.56 There are, however, reasons to think
women are less likely to move out of their company stock
investments as quickly as men when their employer faces
difficulties. Those reasons have nothing to do with lack of
familiarity with general investment principles, although there is
certainly evidence that women do not have as sophisticated
financial and investment knowledge as do men.57 Instead, the
52 A company's highest paid officers may receive in excess of 50% of their total
pension benefits from nonqualified plans. See Kenneth A. Kirk & William J.
Bowden, Finding and Fixing "Broken" Nonqualified Plans, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS J.,
Dec. 1, 2001, at 16.
53 See Dana M. Muir, The Dichotomy Between Investment Advice and
Investment Education: Is No Advice Really the Best Advice?, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 1, 16-17 (2002) (observing that women need a longer stream of retirement
income because they have significantly longer life expectancies than do men); see
also CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, NATIONAL HEALTH CENTER FOR HEALTH
STATISTICS, available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/lifeexpect.htm (stating that
as of 2000, American females have a life expectancy at birth of 79.5 years while
American males have a life expectancy of 74.1 years). '
54 See Muir, supra note 53, at 16 (noting that because of lower compensation,
more part-time work and more breaks in work history, women have lower Social
Security entitlements than do men).
55 See id. (explaining that women have fewer personal assets than do men).
56 See Colleen E. Medill, The Individual Responsibility Model of Retirement
Plans Today: Conforming ERISA Policy to Reality, 49 EMORY L.J. 1, 22 (2000)
(citing findings of Bajtelsmit and VanDerhei that male and female employees have
similar investment allocations to company stock, with males investing 41% of their
account balance in company stock and females investing 42%); Jane Bryant Quinn,
Investing Isn't About Sex, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 2001, at H2 (noting that men tend
to be heavier investors in company stock than women).
57 See Preparing for Retirement: 1000 Americans, Towers Perrin in CCH PENS.
PLAN GUIDE 26,549 (reporting survey findings that males report greater
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reasons are more behavioral in nature.
First, women generally trade securities less frequently than
men, favoring a more long-term or relational approach to
investment. 58 This is an investment trait that generally works
to women's benefit.5 9  In the case of employer securities,
however, it may lead them to stay with their employer
investments longer than is wise.
Second, women tend to have greater loyalty.60 They are thus
more likely to be susceptible to efforts by employers to encourage
employees to remain with their company stock investments.
Women are also more risk averse, tending to be more
conservative investors.61 It is less clear, however, how that
conservatism plays out in the context of employer securities.
Women may perceive that during times of financial turmoil,
remaining invested in their employer is a safer bet. On the other
hand, it may be that women are quicker to learn from the
experience of companies like Enron and Global Crossing that an
familiarity with investment principles than female survey participants); Bryant
Quinn, supra note 56 (commenting that women on average are less exposed to
investing than men and thus have "less stock market know-how").
58 See Jerry Morgan, Mind Games: Behavioral Finance Is Helping to Open the
Door into What Kind of Investor We Are and Why, NEWSDAY, Dec. 19, 1999, at F6
(noting that men trade more frequently than women).
59 See Bryant Quinn, supra note 56 (observing that "the less you trade, the
better you do."); Morgan, supra note 58 (because men trade more frequently, they
have higher costs and are more likely to sell at the wrong time).
6o See Debora Vrana, Investing with Cash, Hearts and Souls, L.A. TIMES, Feb.
25, 1997, at Al (quoting the observation of financial planner Esther Berger that
"[w]omen invest with their souls and their hearts rather than their pocketbooks
alone"). Evidence for this loyalty is seen in how women talk about their employer.
See, e.g., Hearing Before the Senate Governmental Affairs Comm., 107th Cong. 2-3
(2002) (statement of Deborah G. Perotta, a former senior administrative assistant at
Enron, referring to Enron as a family that rewarded employee loyalty and hard
work with large compensation and benefits packages which, in turn, "created an
atmosphere of great pride, trust and respect"); Anthony Violanti, Enron's Crash
Turned Media 'From Lap Dogs to Attack Dogs,' THE BUFF. NEWS, Feb. 15, 2002, at
C4 ("What hurts almost as much ... is that working at 'Enron was like being part of
a community. We cared about each other.' " (quoting former Enron employee and
single mother, Helen Matthews)).
61 See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE (GAO) REP. 96-176, 401(K) PENSION
PLANs-MANY TAKE ADVANTAGE OF OPPORTUNITY TO ENSURE ADEQUATE
RETIREMENT INCOME, 24-25 (Aug. 1996) (finding that female workers tend to be
more conservative investors- than males, particularly women in the 51-61 age
bracket); Muir, supra note 53, at 17 (noting that studies of investment behavior
"uniformly find that women have a lower tolerance for risk than do male investors");
Women in Retirement, FACTS FROM EBRI, Nov. 2001, at 4 (finding women to be
more conservative investors).
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investment in their employer is a riskier proposition than they
thought.
D. Why This Disproportionate Impact Should Be of Concern
It should disturb us that workers are disproportionately
adversely affected by corporate failures such as Enron and
Global Crossing. Apart from our moral outrage that those who
have a hand in the failures are left largely unscathed while
innocent employees suffer,62 two other serious problems flow
from the disproportionate impact on workers.
The first is an aggravation of the rising gap in pay between
executive and rank and file workers. We have already reached a
point where the average pay of a CEO is anywhere from 475 to
500 times the pay of average employees. 63 As I have explored in
more detail elsewhere, this enormous income inequality has
adverse consequences for worker morale and productivity and for
our broader concerns of distributive justice.64 These problems
are obviously aggravated by the kinds of losses to employees that
we are discussing here.
The second problem is a loss of retirement security, since
most of the stock held by rank and file workers is held though
their 401(k) plan accounts. Most Americans fail to accumulate
significant retirement savings apart from their employer-
62 Besides the fact that Enron executives sold massive numbers of shares while
rank and file employees were locked into their 401(k) plan holdings, there are other
respects in which Enron executives profited while rank and file employees suffered.
These include newspaper reports that CEO Ken Lay will receive an annual pension
of almost $500,000 a year and reports of large retention bonuses paid to certain
executives. During the month prior to filing for bankruptcy, Enron paid more than
$80 million to senior executives as retention bonuses. See Jeff St. Onge & Daniel
Taub, U.S. Judge OKs Enron Severance Package, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2002, at C3.
Under a recent court settlement agreement, employees can challenge these
retention bonuses, and, if successful, divide the recovered money. See Severance
Package from Enron is Set, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2002, at C2. To employees who lost
the bulk of their retirement savings and to those employees who were terminated
and paid a pittance in severance-an average of $6,850 under a recent court
settlement. See St. Onge, supra.
63 See Jennifer Reingold & Fred Jespersen, Executive Pay, BUS. WK., Apr. 17,
2000, at 100 (discussing that in 1999 the average CEO earned 475 times the
average wage of a blue-collar worker); Runaway CEO Pay: What's Happening and
What You Can Do About It, supra note 2 (citing Business Week to the effect that the
average CEO made 531 times the average blue-collar's pay in 2000, compared to a
multiple of 85 in 1990).
64 See Stabile, supra note 1 (discussing the consequences of widening gap in pay
between executives and rank and file workers).
2002]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
sponsored pension plans, and Social Security standing alone was
never meant to provide an adequate standard of living in
retirement.6 5  It is thus important that employer-sponsored
pension plan savings be sufficient to provide adequate
retirement income.66 In this vein, we should be particularly
troubled by the fact that low-wage workers-those least likely to
have adequate alternative sources of retirement income-are
"three to five times as likely to have 80 percent or more of their
retirement plan savings in company stock" than high wage
workers. 67 Thus, a significant loss in the value of company stock
will have dire consequences for many low-wage employees.
This loss of retirement security is particularly problematic
for women. Women already are the most vulnerable to
retirement insecurity in the sense that they are less likely to
participate in pension plans than are men.68 Those women that
do participate have lower account balances than males69 as a
65 Social Security provides an average of only 40% of pre-retirement income.
See Democratic Leadership Introduces Clinton's Pension Reform Package, BNA
PENSIONS & BENEFITS DAILY, May 28, 1996, at 23.
66 See Protecting America's Pension Act of 2002, S. 1992, 107th Cong. 2 (2002)
(stating that 401(k) plans are the primary retirement vehicle for forty-seven million
American workers).
67 Gordon P. Goodfellow & Sylvester J. Schieber, Investment of Assets in Self-
Directed Retirement Plans, in POSITIONING PENSIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY 67, 86 (Michael S. Gordon et al. eds., 1997).
68 See GAO REP. TO THE RANKING MINORITY MEMBER, SUBCOMM. ON
OVERSIGHT, HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, H.R. GAO-01-846, PRIVATE
PENSIONS: ISSUES OF COVERAGE AND INCREASING CONTRIBUTION LIMITS FOR
DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLANS, 10, 12 (Sept. 2001) (indicating that 44% of female
employees participate in pension plans compared to 50% of male employees, due to
the facts that "[women workers' lower wages, greater concentration in part-time
jobs, and greater concentration in industries where few employers offer pension
plans"); Patrick J. Purcell, Pension Sponsorship and Participation: Summary of
Recent Trends, CRS REP. FOR CONG., Oct. 4, 2001, at 14 (although women employed
year-round, full-time, are now as likely as males to work for an employer that
sponsors a retirement plan, they are slightly less likely than men to participate in
these plans); Women in Retirement, supra note 61, at 2 (noting that women tend to
work in sectors that do not sponsor retirement plans).
69 See Patrick J. Purcell, Retirement Savings and Household Wealth in 1998:
Analysis of Census Bureau Data, CRS REP. FOR CONG., May 8, 2001, at 22 (average
male worker has plan account balance that is $8730 higher than that of average
female worker); Martha L. Stone, I'm in Charge Financially? Web Sites That Help
Women Take Control of Their Fiscal Futures Are Becoming Abundant, CHI. TRIB.,
July 9, 1998 (noting that only 27% of women in 33-35 year age bracket have 401(k)
plan account balances that exceed $100,000, compared with 43% of men); Women in
Retirement, supra note 61, at 2 (reporting findings that women receive lower
retirement benefits than do men); see also Allen R. Myerson, Wall Street Addresses
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result of factors such as lower wages and more interruptions in
their careers.70  Their greater need for retirement income,
combined with their greater vulnerability to pressures to remain
invested in company stock, make for a significant risk to their
retirement security.
III. How Do WE BETTER PROTECT WORKERS?
It is a mistake to rely on the hope that executives will police
their own behavior; the incentives not to do so are too great.
Thus it is important that Congress take steps to more
aggressively address executives' incentives to engage in
wrongdoing and provide better protection of workers. I have
elsewhere discussed what some of these steps might be, which
include changes in accounting principles designed to introduce
more rationality into the awarding of option compensation, 71 and
outright limits on the acquisition of employer securities by
401(k) plan participants. Others, which have been put forth for
Congress's consideration, include improved disclosure of
company financial affairs to employees and a requirement that
employees be informed when executives and directors engage in
stock sales. 72
It is true that Congress has moved to try to discourage
wrongdoing by executives. The recently enacted Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002,73 which moved through Congress with record speed
in an effort to bolster the confidence of investors, aims to prevent
future business scandals by revising corporate governance
Women's Distinct Needs, NY TIMES, Jul. 31, 1993, at 33 (observing that women wait
longer to start saving for retirement and then save less of their already lowered
income than men).
70 See Lorraine Schmall, Women and Pension Reform: Economic Insecurity and
Old Age, 35 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 673, 677 (discussing factors that contribute to the
likelihood of old-age poverty of women).
71 Although bills have been introduced on a number of occasions that would
require an accounting charge in connection with the granting of stock options, it is
clear that many in Congress view this as a matter to be addressed by the Financial
Standards Accounting Board and not by Congress. See Lee Michael Katz, The
Senate's Quiet Man Hits a Homer, NAT'L JOURNAL, Aug. 3, 2002, at 2324-25
(quoting Sen. Sarbanes).
72 See Protecting America's Pension Act of 2002, S. 1992, 107th Cong. (2002).
73 H.R. 3763, 107th Cong. (2002) (this Act was a result of a combining
Corporate & Auditing Accountability, Responsibility, and Transparency Act of 2002,
H. 3763 with Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of
2002, S. 2673. The resulting amendments to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act bear great
resemblance to H.R. 3763).
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standards, adding new disclosure requirements, and
significantly increasing penalties for corporate wrongdoing.
Whether the Act succeeds in its aims remains to be seen. The
fact is, however, that companies will continue to operate with an
incentive compensation structure that encourages various forms
of executive misbehavior.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act contains only one provision directly
related to the concerns discussed in this Article. The provision
prohibits executives from selling shares of company stock during
periods that 401(k) plan participants are disabled from trading
plan shares because of a lockdown.74 As part of an overall
solution, the provision is unobjectionable. Standing alone,
however, it is akin to trying to put out a forest fire with a tin cup
of water. The fact that executives sold their own shares during a
period in which rank and file employees were prohibited from
selling contributed to the outrage felt at the corrupt corporate
behavior. Lockdowns, however, do not occur very frequently,
and the inability of rank and file employees to be able to sell
during a lockdown, as occurred with Enron employees, is only a
very small piece of the problem.
Congress has shown very little interest in serious reform
aimed directly at reducing the income inequality between
executives and rank and file workers. Attempts to use the tax
code to reduce income inequality by, for example, limiting
deductibility of executive pay to a certain multiple of rank and
file pay, have consistently failed over the years. 75
Regarding the abuses of stock option compensation,
legislation continues to be introduced regarding the accounting
74 H. 3763 § 306(a) (2002) In November 2002, the SEC issued proposed
regulations implementing 306(a) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Sec Release No. 34-
46778, IC 25795 (Nov. 6, 2002).
75 Several times in the last decade, Rep. Martin Sabo introduced legislation
which would deny executive compensation deductions in excess of twenty-five times
the salary paid to the lowest paid employee. See, e.g., Income Equity Act of 1999,
H.R. 740, 106th Cong. (1999); Income Disparities Act of 1991, H.R. 3056, 102d Cong.
(1991). Congress, however, has never responded favorably to these proposals and
the $1 million amount limit on executive compensation deduction remains the only
limitation in the Code. See Mark A. Salky, The Regulatory Regimes for Controlling
Excessive Executive Compensation: Are Both, Either, or Neither Necessary?, 49 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 795, 812-15 (1994) (explaining the current tax regulation allowing
for deductibility in most circumstances of $1 million for executive pay (26 U.S.C. §
162(m) (1993)), and discussing various attempts to change the regime).
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treatment of stock options.76 There is nothing, however, to
indicate that support can be garnered for passage of such a bill.
During a time when most congresspersons were on vacation, a
bill was introduced by Senator Wyden, which aimed at
increasing shareholder oversight over stock option compensation
and reducing the incentive of executives to take action to run up
the company's stock price.77 No one, however, can seriously
believe that this Congress will pass a bill requiring shareholder
approval of all stock options, mandating longer vesting periods,
and restricting the sale by executives of stock acquired upon
option exercise.
In the wake of Enron, Congress has shown some interest in
strengthening retirement security, but it is unclear whether it is
prepared to enact major pension reform. Close to twenty
different bills were introduced for 401(k) plan reform in the
months following the December 2, 2001 bankruptcy filing of
Enron.78 When I testified before the Senate Governmental
Affairs Committee in February 2002, people in Washington
spoke as though enactment of one of these bills was a foregone
conclusion. Yet, at this point in time, it is clear that no law at
all, let alone one that could be termed serious pension reform,
will be enacted in the foreseeable future.79 The House passed its
bill, the Pension Security Act of 2002,80 on April 11, 2002. The
leading Senate bill, the Protecting America's Pension Act of
2002,81 has been reported out of Committee, but still awaits
76 See generally Amy Borrus & P. Dwyer, To Expense or Not To Expense, BUS.
WK., July 29, 2002, at 44 (positing that stock options do not require cash costs,
salary or bonuses); Richard S. Dunham et al., Reform Lite, BUS. WK., Apr. 2002, at
30 (discussing some objectives of President Bush following the rash of corporate
scandals).
77 See Prevention of Stock Option Abuse Act, S. 2822, 107th Cong. (2002).
78 See STABILE, supra note 51, at El-E18 (describing major features of bills
introduced in the wake of Enron bankruptcy).
79 I say this notwithstanding recent statements by some congresspersons that
pension reform will be a high priority agenda item. See Donna Rosato, Doors May
Open to 401(k) Advice, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2002 (citing Sen. Daschle as saying that
pension reform will be second on the agenda behind homeland security).
80 H.R. 3762, 107th Cong. (2002) (enacted) (the stated purpose of the act is to
"giv[e] workers new freedom to diversify their investments, much greater access to
quality investment advice, advance notice before black out periods, more
information about their pensions, and other tools they can use to maximize the
potential of their 401(k) plans and ensure a secure retirement future").
81 S. 1992, 107th Cong. (2002) (permitting employer to contribute either
company stock to 401(k) or offer company stock as investment alternative, but not
both; giving employees access to independent non-conflicted investment advisors;
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action by the Senate. Even if it passes, there are significant
enough differences between the two bills such that compromise
will not be easily reached.8 2 As one pension rights advocate
observed, "Congress in general has been long on rhetoric and
short on action" when it comes to pension reform.8 3 Absent some
evidence of a greater willingness by Congress to act, the
problems discussed herein will only worsen with time.
allowing employee to hold employer accountable if employee loses savings due to
employer mismanagement; requiring employers to inform workers when executives
sale stock; adds worker representation to boards of pension plans).
82 See NAM Official Warns Post-Enron Pension Reform "Fervor" Could Make
Some Companies Drop Retirement Plans, WHITE HOUSE BULLETIN, Aug. 26, 2002.
83 Pamela Yip, Pension Reform: Held Captive?, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug.
19, 2002, at 1D (quoting Karen Friedman of Pension Rights Center). Another
commentator has suggested it is now "a crapshoot" of whether or not pension reform
will happen. Id.
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